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Abstract: This paper investigates the role of intra- and inter-group effects on the ultimatum 
game. The paper presents the identity theory as a framework for analyzing intra- and inter-
group bargaining behavior on the ultimatum game.  An experimental ultimatum game was 
conducted between participants from Washington and Lee University and Virginia Military 
Institute. The results presented shows evidence of ultimatum bargaining behavior being 
influenced by in-group favoritism, along with some evidence of out-group hostility. The 
results also provide possible implications of the effect of testosterone levels.  
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I. Introduction 
Past developments for over twenty years from various researchers within the field of 
experimental economics have gathered data that deviates from the traditional view that human 
beings act in an exclusively self-interested behavior. Experimental games such as the trust game, 
the ultimatum game, and the dictator game provides a robust set of data that consistently 
indicates that human beings act in a reciprocal behavior. Among these experimental games, the 
ultimatum game is perhaps the most vivid game that demonstrates negative reciprocal behavior 
and has been of interest to many experimental economists since its first study conducted by Guth 
et al. (1982). Since then, there have been few established features of human behavior within the 
context of the ultimatum game. Recently, data collected from these experimental games have 
piqued researchers in the possibility of “cultural effects” on bargaining behavior.  
Despite the recent data collected, claims that a cultural impact on the ultimatum game 
bargaining is, perhaps, myopic or even misleading as a precise definition of culture still remains 
somewhat elusive. Manski (2000, 117) states, “Empirical economists may borrow jargon from 
sociology and social psychology, and write that they are studying ‘peer influences,’ 
‘neighborhood effects,’ ‘social capital,’ or some other concept. Yet empirical analyses 
commonly fail to define these concepts with any precision. … Coherent study of social 
interactions require a clear conceptualization of interaction processes”. In response to such 
claims of “cultural effects” on the ultimatum game, this paper proposes that the identity of the 
participants, as opposed to the participant’s culture, is the basis for some of the deviated results 
produced by various experimental studies of the ultimatum game.  
This paper has three intended contributions to the field of experimental economics. First, 
is to provide an application of the utility of the identity function proposed by Akerlof and 
Kranton (2000) within the ultimatum game in regards to the concepts of “cultural effects”. 
3
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Although it may not be comprehensive, the intention is to present an applicable framework that 
provides a methodical process to further delineate the nuances of “culture effects”. Secondly, to 
contribute additional ultimatum game results to the already vast collection of results. And finally, 
to propose possible experiments that will further test the robustness of the proposed framework 
which will allow further understanding of the impact of “culture” and identity on an individual’s 
bargaining behavior.  
A. Ultimatum Game 
A compilation of ultimatum game results find that on average that the proposer’ offers 
40% of the money at stake to the responder while, on average, 16% of the offers are rejected 
(Oosterbeek et al. 2003). Naturally, the rejection rate is lower when proposers’ offers are higher. 
Camerer complies statistics from many studies of ultimatum games using specific offer in one-
shot games. Camerer reports, “Modal and median ultimatum offers are usually 40-50 percent and 
means are 30-40 percent. There are hardly any offers in the outlaying categories of 0, 1-10, and 
the hyper-fair category 51-100. Offers of 40-50 percent are rarely rejected. Offers below 20 
percent or so are rejected about half the time” (Camerer, 2003, p.49).  
Studies that focus on increasing the monetary stakes find no significant changes in the 
proposers’ offers although the rejection rates by the responders decreased as the stake increases 
(Oosterbeek et al., 2003). Another study of the ultimatum game has established that higher 
testosterone levels increases the frequency of rejection rates (Burnham, 2007). Experimental 
studies that compare ultimatum game behaviors among university students ranging from 
Pittsburg to Tokyo found little variations: the mean ultimatum game offer was typically between 
42% to 48% (Henrich et al., 2004).1 However, experimental studies in ultimatum game behaviors 
                                                           
1
 Henrich (p.19), Compared behavior among university students from Pittsburg, Ljubljana (Slovenia) 
Jerusalem, Tokyo, and Yogyakarta (Java, Indonesia). Modal Ultimatum Game offers were consistently 
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among different societies produced mean ultimatum game offers ranging from 25% to 57% 
(Henrich et al., 2004).2 The data collected from the Henrich’s et al. experiments has sparked an 
interest in the possible effects of cultural impacts on the aggregated individual bargaining 
behaviors which might affect the overall economy (Guiso et al., 2006).  
More recently, an experimental study of the ultimatum game involved two factors: first, 
the location of the bargaining experiment, and secondly, the nationality of the participants 
(Swee-Hoon Chuah et al., 2007). The data from this recent study deviates from past anonymous 
ultimatum experiments and the deviations have been attributed to the possibility of a “clash of 
cultures”. The results from Henrich’s et al. (2004) experimental studies shows that different 
societies produce different mean offers in the ultimatum game which provide some justification 
for the argument that culture might affect bargaining behavior. In light of the recent 
developments, a review of the definition of “culture” in economics is presented below.  
B. Culture 
Guiso et al. (2006, 23) defines culture as “those customary belief and values that ethnic, 
religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation”.  Guiso et 
al. continues by dividing culture into two components: a “slow-moving” component which he 
provides a definition for, as stated above, and a “fast-moving” component of culture which he 
refers to Manski (2000) but refrains from exploring. Unaccounted for by Guiso et al. (2006) in 
his overview of culture is social norms. Bernhard et al. (2006, 217) defines social norms as 
“standards of behavior that are based on widely shared beliefs about how individual group 
members ought to behave in a given situation”. The definition of Bernhard’s social norms and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
50% among university students. 
2
 Henrich (p. 19), Compared behaviors from 15 different societies: Lamalera, Ache, Pittsburgh, Shona, 
Orma, Au, Achuar, Sangu, Gnau, Tsimane, Kazakh, Torguud, Mapuche, Hadza, Machiguenga, and 
Quichua. The sample modes varied from 15% to 50%. 
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Guiso’s definition of the “slow-moving” component of culture are quite similar. In a similar 
context, the distinction between the “fast-moving” component of culture and social norms is also 
vague. The following sections attempts to delineate the subtle differences between the three 
components of culture.  
Bernhard’s definition of social norms is more specific than Guiso’s definition of culture. 
She continues to state:  
“There are norms of fairness, cooperation, politeness, honesty, and subordination; 
norms regarding gender relations, and so on. Many people obey social norms 
voluntarily because their individual goals are in line with the behavior normatively 
prescribed. … Another important aspect of social norms is that they are group 
specific. There are no norms without social groups-social norms emerge through 
interactions in groups, they apply to interactions within groups, and group members 
enforce them. … Thus, group affiliations and ingroup-outgroup relations are 
presumably crucial determinates of normative behavior” (p. 217).  
The key difference that needs to be pointed out is that social norms are prescribed whereas 
culture, at least the “slow-moving” component, is not prescribed nor enforced, but rather 
endowed upon an individual. Guiso’s quotes Becker (1996, 16) stating: “Individuals cannot alter 
their ethnicity, race, or family history, and only with difficulty can they change their country or 
religion. Because of the difficulty of changing culture and its low depreciation rate, culture is 
largely a ‘given’ to individuals throughout their lifetimes (p.24)”. Given the difference between 
social norms and the “slow-moving” components of culture, the differences between social 
norms and the “fast-moving” components of culture are more subtle.  
Although Manski (2000, 122-123) never mentions a “fast-moving” component of culture, 
he does mention the term “social capital” and the troubles of defining it: “The origin of ‘social 
capital’ should be a resolvable matter, but the meaning of the term may not be. … As I see it, the 
relevant question for economists is whether ‘social capital,’ ‘community,’ and other sociological 
concepts convey ideas that are missing in modern economic thought-ideas that cannot be 
6
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expressed using the core concepts of preferences, expectations, constraints, and equilibrium”. 
Even though the concepts of a “fast-moving” component of culture remains elusive outside of 
the terms such as “community” or “social capital”, it can be rationalized that the formation of 
groups or “communities” determine the social norms. Bernhard stated that social norms are 
group specific and that norms cannot exist without interactions within or among groups. 
Therefore it can be induced that Manski’s (2000) “social capital” or Gusio’s et al. (2006) “fast-
moving” component of culture are groups formed by individual choice where interactions with 
other groups in turn creates the prescribed social norms. 
II. Theory 
The following section attempts to integrate the utility of the identity function with the 
concepts of the “slow-moving” components of culture, the “fast-moving” components of culture, 
and “social norms” in regards to the ultimatum game. The utility theory and models of rational 
choice are only approximations of human behavior and not applicable to all cases, and specific 
counterexamples are not sufficient arguments to abandon the rationality model (Kagel and Roth, 
1995, 77). Furthermore, variations which relax the stringency of some assumptions or introduce 
new parameters to the utility theory have been motivated by repeated experiments that 
systematically violate the utility theory (Kagel and Roth, 1995, 78). These experiments that 
explore violations of the utility theory are important because they present the shortcomings of the 
utility theory, and offer new parameters to consider and further delineate older approximations. 
Therefore, instead of attempting to create a new model for behavior, this paper borrows the 
utility of the identity function formulated by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) to attempt an 
explanation within the parameters of the utility function for the behavior presented by the data 
set of the ultimatum game in regards the impact of “culture”.  
7
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Before presenting the identity function in its relationship with the ultimatum bargaining 
game a brief overview of Akerlof and Kranton is presented3. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) 
proposed the following utility function that account for identity: 
1) Uj = Uj(aj,a-j,Ij). 
The three variables that formulates the utility of person j is the identity or self-image represented 
by Ij, the usual vectors of j’s actions represented by aj, and the vectors of other’s actions 
represented by a
-j. Furthermore, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) continue to propose the 
representation of Ij in the following: 
2) Ij = Ij(aj,a-j,cj,j,P).  
The three additional variables that formulates the identity of person j is the assigned social 
category or social status represented by cj, the given characteristics of person j represented by j, 
and the prescribed behavior that is expected from the social category or social status assigned to 
person j represented by P. 4 The assignments of the variables are simple, but the interactions 
between and among the variables are complex. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) mentions that the 
identity of person j depends on the extent to which j’s own actions and other’s actions 
correspond to the prescribed behavior indicated by P. Therefore, the increase or decrease of 
utility that is derived from Ij is the gain or loss in identity.  
Simply stated, the gain or loss of identity along with utility is dependent on the actions 
taken by the person j and the actions of others where the expected behavior of person j is 
prescribed by the social status or category person j is assigned and the individual characteristics 
                                                           
References 
3
 For further reading read Akerlof and Kranton’s Economics and Identity (2000). 
4
 Akerlof and Kranton (p.719-720), For a comprehensive overview of the interactions of the variables. 
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of person j. In other words, j maximizes utility by choosing aj in accordance to how well j = P 
where P is derived from cj along with a-j. Like Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and the neoclassic 
utility theory, this paper is agnostic as to whether or not an individual is aware of the reason for 
choosing a specific vector of choice. In regarding choice, to some extent j may choose cj, 
although this “choice” may or may not be a conscious decision. But since cj is derived from the 
aggregate composition of aj and a-j which defines P, cj is subject to change over time as aj and a-j 
changes. As a final note on cj and P, there may not be a universal consensus about social 
categories and prescribed behaviors because of its subjective and malleable nature.  
This paper makes the assertion that cj is Manski’s (2000) “community” or “social capital”, 
or Gusio’s et al. (2006) “fast moving” component of culture, where cj, the social category or 
social status, defines where an individual stands in which “community” or within what 
“community”. Since an individual, throughout one’s lifetime, is composed of more than one 
social category, an accumulation or aggregation of one’s “social capital” or “community” would 
define j, or Guiso’s “slow-moving” component of culture, in combination with the genotype of 
an individual which would define the boundaries of an individual’s phenotype. Furthermore, P is 
similar to the description of social norms as stated above by Bernhard et al.(2006). The variable 
P which is defined as the prescribed behavior through the interactions of among groups is 
influenced mainly by cj, but also includes the aggregate group composition of j as a group is 
defined by its members. Restated in Gusio’s et al. (2006) terms, cj is the “fast-moving” 
components of “culture”, j is the “slow-moving” components of “culture” or Manski’s (2000) 
“social capital”, and P is Bernhard’s et al. (2006) social norms for prescribed behavior.  
For the purposes of this paper, the cultural effects are not as important as the awareness 
of the participant’s identity in terms of social categories and its effects on the ultimatum 
9
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experiment. Manski (2000, 119) stated that, “Expectations interactions pervade the modern 
economics of information. A central concern is to understand the interactions of agents who 
know that other agents possess private information”. In accordance to the Manski’s statement, 
this paper is also concerned with the awareness of participants of other participants and its 
effects on bargaining behavior. Since there is no consensus on an economic model of reciprocity, 
this paper will assume that the aggregate ultimatum game results from an anonymous one-shot 
game is the given equilibrium point for both rejection rates and proposal offers.  
To augment Akerlof and Kranton’s utility of the identity function for the ultimatum game 
there are assumptions made that alter the utility of the identity function to fit the anonymous 
ultimatum game. In ultimatum bargaining experiments where participants are anonymous, the 
utility of the proposer and responder is based off the identity function proposed in the following 
figure: 
3) Uj = Uj(aj,Ij).   Ui = Ui(ai,aj,Ii). 
The proposer’s utility function remains similar, but a
-j is excluded because one assumption is that 
the proposer, j, does not know the other proposers’ vectors of actions in the ultimatum game nor 
has previous knowledge of past research of the ultimatum bargaining game. However, the utility 
function of the responder, i, knows the vector of action taken by the proposer, j, but does not 
know the other responders’ vectors of actions in the ultimatum game nor has previous knowledge 
of past research. Therefore the utility of the responder is composed of the action of the responder 
represented by ai, the action of the proposer aj, and the identity of the responder Ii.  
 Again, since the proposers and responders are anonymous to each other during the 
ultimatum bargaining game, this assumption also affects the identity function as follows: 
10
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4) Ij = Ij(aj,j,P)    Ii = Ii(ai,aj,i,P)  
The identity function for both the proposer and responder is similar to their utility function but 
has two additional considerations of the individual’s given characteristics, j and i, 
respectively, and the prescribed behavior, P, which is influenced by the given aggregate of the 
group’s individual characteristics. The variable of the social category or social status, cj and ci, 
respectively, is omitted for both proposer’s and responder’s identity functions because both 
participants are only aware of each other as human beings. One additional note that must be 
included is that the variables within the Ij and Ii, respectively is endogenous within identity 
function. However it is unaccounted for within Uj and Ui, respectively and should be considered 
exogenous within the framework of the utility of the identity function.  
In the case of an anonymous ultimatum game, social status does not exist outside of 
proposers and responders since neither participants are aware of the cj, social status or social 
category, of the other and therefore a P, the prescribed behavior or social norms, remains trivial. 
Given that over twenty years of anonymous ultimatum bargaining experiments have been 
conducted with consistent results that proposers, on average, offer 40% of the monetary stake, 
this paper will make the assumption that an offer of 40% is the equilibrium or “convex point” of 
a proposer who plays a one-shot ultimatum game. With a similar frame of mind, responders, on 
average, do not accept offers less than 20% of the monetary stake, this paper will make the 
assumption that offers less than 20% of the monetary stake will surpass the “threshold” point 
where utility is gained by rejecting the offer from the proposer of a responder who plays a one-
shot ultimatum bargaining game.   
 Continuing from the parameter’s stated above; the utility of the identity is augmented 
once more to account for the participant’s awareness of their corresponding bargaining partner. 
11
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Whereas once the participants are aware of their corresponding partner’s identity, the utility of 
the identity function changes into the following: 
5) Uj = Uj(aj,ci,Ij).   Ui = Ui(ai,aj,cj,Ii). 
The awareness of the bargaining partner creates additional consideration that might shift the 
utility curve of the proposer and responder, respectively. More importantly, partial awareness, 
where only a specific social category or social status is known by the participants, can mitigate 
or exacerbate social distances between bargaining partners which, in turn, augments the utility 
gained or lost from a specific vector of action, aj or ai respectively. However the utility of the 
proposer, Uj is derived from the action taken, aj, which is based upon the information of the 
responder’s social category or social status, ci, and the identity of the proposer Ij. The saliency of 
the cj and ci makes the social category an endogenous variable within the utility of the identity 
function. Similarly, the utility of the responder, Ui, is derived from the action taken, ai, which is 
based upon the action of the proposer, aj, the proposer’s social category or social status, cj, and 
the identity of the responder, Ii.  
Given the utility of the identity function of proposers and responders behavior in the one-
shot ultimatum bargaining game, the identity function of the both proposer and responder is 
proposed as the following:  
6) Ij = Ij(aj,cj,j,P)    Ii = Ii(ai,aj,ci,i,P)  
The inclusion of cj and ci will affect P which in turn will affect the results of ultimatum game. 
How cj and ci might alter P will also depend on whether cj = ci or whether cj ≠ ci. Another factor 
that will influence the identity of both proposer and responder, Ij and Ii, and ultimately the utility 
gained or lost from the vector of action taken by the participants respectively, aj and ai, is how 
12
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well their given characteristics, j or i, corresponds with the prescribed behavior, P, of the 
assigned social status, cj and ci. It must be noted that a “slow-moving” cultural effects might 
exist within the variable of j and i, but a salient inclusion of the “fast-moving” cultural effects 
of cj and ci will alter P along with the utility gained or lost, and subsequently, the outcome of the 
results.  
By controlling which social categories will be the endogenous variables, deviated results 
from the traditional ultimatum game results can be analyzed with better precision. With this 
application and integration of the identity function to the ultimatum bargaining game in regards 
to “culture” in mind, an experiment was conducted between students of Washington and Lee 
University (W&L) and students of Virginia Military Institute (VMI).  
III. Method 
 The objective of this paper is to assess the nature of the impact that the awareness of 
identity has on intra- and inter-group affiliation on the participant’s behavior in the ultimatum 
game. In the ultimatum game, the “proposer” offers a division of a monetary stake to a 
“responder” who either accepts or rejects. If the offer is accepted, then the proposed shares are 
paid out; otherwise neither players receives anything. Approaching the ultimatum game using 
backwards induction would predict that the rational responder would accept any positive amount 
offered. The rational proposer would anticipate this response and offer the lowest amount 
possible. Thus the sub-game perfect equilibrium for the proposer would be to offer the smallest 
amount possible, and the responder to accept any given amount above zero. Over twenty years of 
experiments have shown that this is not the case. Therefore to assess the effects of intra- and 
inter-group affiliations an experimental design similar to Swee-Hoon Chuah et al. (2007) and 
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) has been reproduced.  
13
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 A series of experiments was conducted in both academic institutions where the 
participants made their decisions at their respective institutions involving a total of N = 232 
participants associated with Washington and Lee University and Virginia Military Institute. 
Participants from Washington and Lee University were recruited from either introductory 
economic classes or surveys whereas participants from Virginia Military Institute were recruited 
strictly from surveys. All participants were students attending their respective institution during 
the early spring of 2007. The ultimatum game design involved the intra- and inter-group 
parameters of institutional affiliations of either Washington and Lee University or Virginia 
Military Institute which generates 2² = 4 possible experimental conditions for each game (See 
Table 1). The participants were divided into proposers and responders, and respectively for their 
institutional affiliation. Other than their institutional affiliation, the participants were told nothing 
about their particular opponent who was randomly chosen from the other group, but otherwise 
remained anonymous. The participants were asked to read and sign a consent form, fill out a 
quick survey, and were briefed on the rules of the ultimatum games. The forms were distributed 
among the proposers and collected after their choices were indicated. Subsequently, the forms 
were shuffled and randomly distributed to responders to indicate their decision. The stake size 
was ten dollars. Due to a lack of funding only half of the participants were randomly paid. The 
participants were made aware of this before the consent form was distributed.  
 
Table 1  
Description of the four experimental conditions according to the subject’s group affiliation as W&L: Washington 
and Lee University and VMI: Virginia Military Institute. 
Condition Description  Proposer Responder  Pairs 
1.  VV   VMI   VMI   28 
2.  VW   VMI   W&L   29 
3.  WV   W&L   VMI   30 
4.  WW   W&L   W&L   29 
Total           116 
14
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IV. Results 
 This experiment generated a data set of observation and responses for 116 games played 
under the four different conditions with roughly 29 games per condition. Table 2 contains a 
summary in terms of the mean percentage of the stakes offered to the responder (O) as well as 
rejection rates as a proportion of all responses (R) for each condition. The original conditions 
given from the parameter in Table 1 is presented in addition to five other conditions that show 
different combinations of the previous four conditions. VA represents VMI proposers with the 
aggregated responders. WA represents W&L proposers with the aggregated responders. AW 
represents the aggregated proposers with W&L responders. AV represents the aggregated 
proposers with VMI responders, represented by AV. Lastly, AA represents the total aggregated 
results from proposers and responders. By grouping the different conditions in the given methods 
above, the data can be compared for behavioral differences given the salience of the identity of 
the participants for intra- and inter-group comparisons as well as the aggregated group behavior 
as a whole.  
The descriptive statistics of the offer levels (O) and rejection rates (R) provide some 
interesting results that are worth examining. The mean offer of VMI’s intra-group bargaining 
behavior, VV, is slightly above 50% but drops by 5.18% when under the condition of inter-group 
bargaining, VW. However the mode offer of 50% increases by 8.62% under the condition of VW 
when compared to VV. Similarly, the mean offer of W&L’s intra-group bargaining, WW, is 
higher by 3.32% than the condition of W&L’s inter-group bargaining, WV, but here the mode 
offer of 50% is 51.72% under the condition of WW, which drops by 5.06% to 46.66% under the 
condition of WV. When comparing the rejection rates in regards to intra- and inter-group 
bargaining provides some interesting insights. The rejection rate for VV is 14.28% but jumps to 
50% under the condition of WV. Similarly, but not as significantly, WV’s rejection rate is lower 
15
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by 3.45 when compared to WW, but interestingly, despite the higher mean offer of the condition 
VW this condition has a higher rejection rates than the WW. One final notable observation from 
Table 2 is the standard deviations. The standard deviations of offers are less than 1 only under 
the condition of VV and WW, whereas under all other conditions, the standard deviations are 
above 1. From this table alone the affects of in-group favoritism can be observed. Through the 
awareness of the identity, intra-group bargaining implies higher mean offers, lower rejection 
rates, and a less volatile distribution of offers when compared to inter-group bargaining.  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for offer levels O and rejection rates R by the participant’s group affiliation. 
Condition  O          R 
  Mean  Median  Mode  S.D. 
1. VV  50.35%  50%  50 (50.00%) 0.961    14.28% 
2. VW  45.17%  50%  50 (58.62%) 1.957    13.79% 
3. WV  38.83%  50%  50 (46.66%) 1.595    50.00% 
4. WW  42.15%  50%  50 (51.72%) 0.915    10.34% 
 
5. VA  47.71%  50%  50 (54.38%) 1.558    14.03% 
6. WA  40.46%  50%  50 (49.15%) 1.306    30.50% 
7. AW  43.66%  50%  50 (55.17%) 1.521    11.86%  
8. AV  44.39%  50%  50 (48.27%) 1.439    32.75% 
 
9. AA  44.03%  50%  50 (51.72%) 1.475    22.41% 
 
 
 To further scrutinize the data, Table 3 presents the distribution of offers in accordance to 
their size quintiles. As the standard deviations have shown above, there is a convergence of the 
distribution of offers under the conditions of VV and WW. The condition of WW does not have 
any offers within the range of 0-20% nor 61-80%, but the offers are almost evenly distributed 
between the ranges from 21-40% and 41-60%. Under the condition of VV, 75% of the offers fall 
into the range group of 41-60%. Unlike the conditions of VV and WW, the distribution of offers 
is broader under the conditions of VW and WV. 23.33% of the offers under the condition of WV 
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falls within the range of 0-20% whereas the condition of WW did not have any offers within the 
range of 0-20%, but interestingly enough the number of offers within the range of 41-60% 
increased by 4.92%. However, in the case of comparing VV with VW, offers within the range of 
41-60% dropped by 9.49%, but, like the comparison of WW and WV, an increase in 0-20% 
offers occurred and also some offers within the range of 61-80% increased. In both cases of 
inter-group bargaining, the number of offers within the range of 21-40% dropped by over 10%. 
The only other notable observation is that only the VA condition offered more than 61% where 
as the WA condition offered nothing over 61%. Also, as mentioned above, the percentage of 
mode offer of 50% changes depending on the responder’s group affiliation. VMI proposers 
offered less equitable offers when faced with inter-group bargaining when compared to their 
intra-group bargaining, and conversely W&L proposers offered more equitable offers when 
faced with inter-group bargaining when compared to intra-group bargaining.  
 
Table 3 
The distribution of offers over nine conditions of analysis and the offered size quintiles. The percentages represent 
the proportion of offers over the total number of offers within each condition and their corresponding sizes quintiles.  
Condition  O 
  0-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81-100% 
1. VV  3.57%  17.85%  75.00%  3.57%  0%   
2. VW  17.24%  6.89%  65.51%  10.34%  0% 
3. WV  23.33%  20.00%  56.66%  0%  0% 
4. WW  0%  48.27%  51.72%  0%  0% 
 
5. VA  10.52%  12.28%  70.17%  7.01%  0%  
6. WA  11.86%  33.89%  54.23%  0%  0% 
7. AW  8.62%  27.58%  58.62%  5.17%  0% 
8. AV  13.79%  18.96%  65.51%  1.72%  0% 
 
9. AA  11.20%  23.27%  62.06%  3.44%  0%  
 
 The final analysis of the proposers’ offers was conducted through the Mann-Whitney U 
statistical test presented in Table 4. Three tests were conducted grouped by the proposers. 
Although the Mann-Whitney U statistical test confirms the aggregated difference of offer level 
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made by W&L and VMI’s proposer’s offer levels (z = 3.4, p = 0.0007); the tests do not confirm 
any difference in offer levels made by the W&L and VMI’s proposers in regards to the 
responder’s group affiliation. This result is insightful and somewhat contrary due to a less 
volatile distribution of offer levels within intra-group bargaining offers, but the offer levels do 
not significantly change from the aggregated group offer levels.   
 
Table 4 
Mann-Whitney U statistical z scores and associated p-values (two-tailed) for pairwise comparisons of offer levels O 
under the different experimental conditions. 
Conditions   z-score    p  
1. VA/WA   3.400    0.0007* 
2. VV/VW   0.822    0.4108   
3. WV/WW   -0.033    0.9735 
*This result was derived from using STATA and at the time n = 114.  
Table 5 reports the distribution of the rejection rates according to the number of offers 
given by the proposers. Again, the table presents that there are fewer rejections under the 
conditions of VV and WW when compared to VW and WV. Furthermore rejections of WV is 
significantly higher than any other results shown on the table, and as for VW only offers less 
than 20% were rejected. It is interesting to observe that only offer between the 41-60% range 
were rejected in the condition of VV. Also another interesting observation is the comparison of 
the conditions of VW and WW. In the case of VW there are rejections only when the offers are 
less than 20%, but in the case of WW offers of 21-40% were rejected and even an offer of 41-
60% was rejected. A comparison of Table 3 and Table 5 will show that there were no offers 
within the range of 0-20% made under the condition of WW whereas under the condition of VV 
there were offers within the range of 0-20% and 21-40%, but Table 5 shows that under the 
condition of VV, no offers made within the range of 0-40% were rejected although some of the 
offers within the range of 41-60% were rejected. Comparison of the conditions of VV and VW 
shows a comparatively high rejection rate when faced with inter-group bargaining.  
18
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 4 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol4/iss1/6
19 
 
 
Table 5 
The distribution of rejections rates in percentages of their given offered size quintiles.  
Conditions O 
  0-20%  21-40%  41-60%  61-80%  81-100% 
1. VV   0%  0%  19.04%  0%  0% 
2. VW  80.00%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
3. WV  85.71%  50.00%  35.29%  0%  0% 
4. WW  0%  14.28%  6.66%  0%  0% 
 
5. VA  66.66%  0%  10.00%  0%  0% 
6. WA   85.71%  25.00%  21.87%  0%  0% 
7. AW  80.00%  12.50%  2.94%  0%  0% 
8. AV  75.00%  27.27%  26.31%  0%  0% 
 
9. AA  76.92%  18.51%  15.27%  0%  0% 
 
Because some of the interesting results, further scrutiny was under took to see of some of 
the results were due to male female differences, age, or education level. Table 6 presents the 
demographics of the population sample. Gender and age has been known to significantly alter 
the results, but age, in this case, has been relatively constant among the subjects. Also the GDYR 
represents the graduation year of the participants to investigate whether the amount of time spend 
at the participant’s respective institutions affect bargaining behavior. But like the variable of age 
the mean number of years the participants spent in their respective institution remained relatively 
constant.  
The variable of gender shows some significant deviations ranging from 17 percent to 60 
percent females within various groups. Eckel and Grossman (1998) conducted a double-
anonymous dictator experiment that concluded that females tended to be more socially-
orientated (selfless) while males tended to be more individually-orientated (selfish). This would 
imply that in an ultimatum experiment females on average would offer more equitable offers and 
would accept lower offers than males. However, for this experiment the participants were not 
informed on the gender of others, but only the participant’s group affiliation.  
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The comparison of Table 2 and Table 6 shows some contrary results of Eckel and 
Grossman’s (1998) conclusion of gender differences. The percentage of female proposers in the 
conditions of VV is a lower percentage than VW, but VV’s mean proposal offer is higher than 
VW’s mean proposal offer. Also, the percentage of female responders in the conditions of VV is 
a lower percentage than WV, but WV has a higher rejection rate than VV. Although these two 
results implies the conclusion of Eckel and Grossman’s (1998) experiment, this particular 
experiment placed emphasis on the awareness of salient social categories.  
 
Table 6 
Demographics of proposers and responders by experimental conditions. 
  Condition 
  VV VW WV WW VA WA AW AV AA  
Proposer 
FEM  35.71 60.71 36.66 51.72 48.21 44.06 56.14 36.20 46.08 
AGE  20.39 20.5 19.4 19.03 20.44 19.21  19.75 19.87 19.81 
GDYR  8.21 8.07 9.4 9.37 8.14 9.38 8.73 8.82 8.77 
Responder 
FEM  17.85 39.28 30.0 44.82 28.57 37.28 42.10 24.13 33.04 
AGE  19.82 19.72 20.27 20.0 19.77 20.13 19.52 20.05 19.95 
GDYR  8.85 8.96 8.46 8.75 8.90 8.60 8.70 8.64 8.74  
* 115 observations were available as one survey for the proposer did not filled and one survey from the responder 
was omitted. Some participants were reluctant or did not completely fill out the questionnaire.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 Needless to say, the results from the data above show that as the social categories of the 
participants becomes salient, bargaining behavior changes in terms of intra- and inter-group 
differences where in-group favoritism and perhaps out-group hostility is displayed. The data 
implies few conclusions and presents several questions that remain to be resolved. The results 
also indicate behavioral differences in offer levels between W&L proposers and VMI proposers 
implying the existence of some sort of social norm.  
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 The difference between W&L and VMI proposers’ offer levels can be interpreted in two 
different ways. Burnham’s (2007) study found that individuals with high testosterone levels 
might correlate with higher offer levels, but Burnham’s study did find statistically significant 
correlations between testosterone levels and rejection rates. This study finds that VMI 
participants have higher rejection rates and higher offer levels when compared to W&L 
participants. Since VMI is a military academy, it is possible that the institution served as a proxy 
where, on average, VMI participants had higher testosterone levels when compared to W&L 
participants. Another experiment with saliva samples can easily resolve this assumption. 
Given the current uncertainty, and accounting for Henrich’s past studies, another 
explanation could be that each institution acted as a proxy for collectivism and individualism; 
where VMI participants have a heightened sense of collectivism whereas W&L participants have 
a heightened sense of individualism due to the fact that the former is a military academy and the 
later is a liberal arts academy. Ball’s (2001, 58) states that “In more individualistic societies, 
people tend to behave like Homo economicus: they choose actions that maximize their private 
material self-interest. In more collectivist societies, people tend to behave like Homo 
sociologicus: their actions are conditioned by the norms, expectations, and interests of the social 
groups of which they are part”. Perhaps, a survey focusing on these aspects might resolve such 
differences and their affects, if any, on the behavior of ultimatum bargaining game.  
 The results also points towards the implications of the existence of social norms. As 
mentioned above, since groups create the social norms, the partial awareness of the identity will 
form the social norms of the group’s affiliation. The standard deviations in offers indicate that 
intra-group bargaining behavior is less volatile and more equitable, if not more favorable as 
implied by the results. However, when offers are made under an inter-group condition, the offer 
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levels are more volatile where offers are ranging from 21-40% offers deviate into either lower 
offers or more equitable offers or even some hyper-fair offers. The differences between the intra-
group and inter-group bargaining might be that social norms are unknown in inter-group 
bargaining whereas in intra-group bargaining a social norm exists, although it might not be 
specified, within the concept of certain expectations, restated as social norms. 
 On hindsight, an anonymous condition should have been conducted to verify the 
bargaining behavior without the additional variable of group affiliation. Another experiment 
conducted anonymously among W&L and VMI participants would be beneficial to verify the 
statistically significant difference of mean offer and rejection rate.  
This paper does not presume that the data will be replicated through just the participant’s 
group affiliation. Davis (2006, 372) presented interesting questions where two issues occur: 
“how a single person can have different selves understood as a person’s different social identities, 
and how different persons can make up a single social group understood as their shared social 
identity”. He concludes that “it seems that the individual objective function per se involves a 
different type of representation associated with its higher order character” (387). 5 Because the 
experiment conducted for this paper was based upon the individual’s current and salient social 
group which was chosen by the individual, different experiments focusing on social grouping 
such as race or ethnicity, characteristics endowed upon the individual, is bound to produce 
different results. An example would be Chuah et al.’s (2007) experiment where the results 
deviated from this experiment but has some similarities. As a result, the identity of group 
affiliation would depend of what kind of group affiliation is being tested ethnicity, nationality, 
                                                           
References 
5
 For further references of the second issue read John B. Davis, Social Identity Strategies in Recent 
Economics.   
22
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 4 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 6
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol4/iss1/6
23 
 
education, employment, and etc might produced different results as different social categories 
might raise or lower self-esteem in regards to the given situation.  
There are two major and two minor possibilities that need to be given consideration 
before a concrete assertion can be made, the first consideration that must be acknowledged is that 
the comparison made was between a military institute and a liberal arts institute. VMI is a 
military school could have been a proxy for either the overall testosterone levels or collectivism. 
Although testosterone levels have been shown for a higher frequency of rejection rates such 
behavior was curtailed when intra-group bargaining occurred. Perhaps it is combination of the 
two effects where the testosterone levels affected the higher offer levels and the higher rejection 
rates, but the cultivated sense of collectivism curtailed the innate reactions. Secondly, only half 
of the participants were randomly chosen to be paid out, therefore it is conceivable that some 
participants did not take this experiment seriously. A third consideration was the location while 
conducting the experiment. In this experiment the participants filled out the survey in their 
respective institution as the experiment was conducted before the awareness of Swee-Hoon 
Chuang et al. (2007) research. Finally, the last and perhaps unnecessary consideration is that the 
experimenter is institutionally affiliated with W&L and the information might have a slight 
impact on the behavior of VMI participants as well as W&L participants.   
In regards to the Guiso’s et al. (2000) definition of culture, it would be interesting to see 
if the results are replicated when the experiment is conducted among alumni. One note for this 
experiment would be that the experimenter must be careful not to have the experiment conducted 
by the same participants. An anonymous ultimatum experiment and an awareness of group 
affiliation ultimatum experiment could be conducted to compare and contrast the saliency of 
group affiliation.  
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It is not the intentions of this paper to predict how expectations and preferences might be 
altered due to an ingroup and outgroup effects, but rather to confirm that the concepts of the 
identity function and awareness of the participants’ group affiliation have a significant impact on 
bargaining behavior. Furthermore, as stated above and before by Akerlof and Kranton the 
prescribed behavior of social categorization and social status is malleable. Further research 
should be conducted to gather more data to make precise assertions about culture, identity, and 
bargaining behaviors that violate the former utility functions to retain and further strengthen the 
theoretical use of the revised utility theory.  
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